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I. INTRODUCTION
With respect to current and future warfare, it is virtually impossible to
H[DJJHUDWHWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRILQIRUPDWLRQWHFKQRORJ\7RGD\¶VDUPHGIRUFHV
use a host of weapons, munitions, and systems that function through the
operation of highly sophisticated information systems.1 For instance, the
command and control of operational forces are increasingly coordinated and
directed through computer-based networks that allow for real-time sharing of
information and common pictures of the battlespace.2 Moreover, logistics, at
all levels of warfare, are entirely at the mercy of information systems. And, of
* Colonel David Wallace is the Professor and Head, Department of Law, United States Military
Academy at West Point, New York. In 2017, Colonel Wallace served as a Visiting Scholar at the
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn, Estonia. The author
would like to thank the NATO CCDCOE Director, Merle Maigre, the Law Branch Chief, Lauri
Aasmann, and all of the members of the Law Branch for their collegial assistance and support during
the fellowship. Lieutenant Colonel Shane Reeves is the Professor and Deputy Head, Department of
Law, United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. He is an Associate Professor of Law.
Major Trent Powell is serving as an action officer in the Future Concepts Directorate at The Judge
Advocate General's Legal Center & School. Major Powell previously served as an Assistant Professor
of Law, Department of Law, United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. The opinions,
conclusions, and recommendations in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department
of Defense, the United States Army, or the United States Military Academy.
1. COMM. ON OFFENSIVE INFO. WARFARE, NAT¶L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT¶L ACADS.,
TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF
CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 9 (William A. Owens et al. eds., 2009).
2. Id.
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course, in recent years the development of cutting edge, high-tech cyber
weapons allow for an attack against an adversary in both virtual and real
domains.3 :KLOHWKLV³1HZ$JHRI &\EHU´PD\VHHPWRUDLVHTXHVWLRQVDERXW
the legal framework applicable to the conduct of such operations, the traditional
normative legal structure for warfare, the jus ad bellum4 and the jus in bello,5
still regulate the actions of belligerents engaged in cyber hostilities.
This article deals with legal issues in the cyber warfare context related to
the jus in bello, which is also referred to as international humanitarian law
(IHL). The international legal community acknowledges and widely accepts
that IHL applies to cyber operations undertaken in the context of an armed
conflict.6 The challenge, of course, is not that IHL applies, but rather how it
specifically applies to cyber operations. Unquestionably, digital means and
methods of warfare executed in both the virtual and real world pose novel
issues.7 In this regard, it is necessary to consider and examine how pre-cyber
IHL laws, as well as the values that formed the foundation for those laws,8
translate into regulation of armed conflicts in the New Age of Cyber. Although
there are many issues and topics that are worthy of such a re-examination, few
are as controversial as the notion of belligerent reprisals under IHL.
As will be discussed in detail below, a belligerent reprisal under IHL is a
method of warfare that is otherwise unlawful but, in exceptional cases, is lawful
when used as an enforcement mechanism in response to unlawful enemy acts.9
As noted by Professor William Schabas, ³>U@HSULVDO DPRXQWV WR DQ DUJXPHQW
that crimes are justifiable as a proportionate response to criminal acts
committed by the other party. In a sense, it is the most ancient means of
3. Id. at 10.
4. Jus ad bellum addresses when a State may use force under international law. What are Jus ad
bellum and Jus in bello? INT¶L COMM. RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/what-are-jusad-bellum-and-jus-bello-0 [https://perma.cc/7AP3-7D8M] (last visited Nov. 7, 2017). Some legal
commentators have observed that the United Nations Charter creates a legal regime more accurately
characterized as jus contra bellum because it is fundamentally devised to prevent the use of force. See
ROBERT KOLB & RICHARD HYDE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICTS 13 (2008).
5. The jus in bello regulates the conduct of parties engaged in an armed conflict. See What are
Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello?, supra note 4.
6. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
OPERATIONS 3 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0].
7. See, e.g., David Wallace & Shane R. Reeves, The Law of Armed Conflict’s “Wicked”
Problem: Levée en Masse in Cyber Warfare, 89 INT¶L L. STUD. 646, 666±67 (2013) (discussing the
difficulty of applying the traditional IHL interpretation of a levée en masse in the cyber domain).
8. HEATHER HARRISON DINNISS, CYBER WARFARE AND THE LAWS OF WAR 239±40 (James
Crawford & John S. Bell eds., 2012).
9. 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 513 (2005).
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HQIRUFHPHQW RI WKH ODZ´10 8QGHU WKLV DVVHUWLRQ WKHQ D ³SURSRUWLRQDWH
UHVSRQVH´E\DQDJJULHYHGSDUW\VHUYHVDVDjus in bello enforcement of the law.
And, because the enforcement of international law and IHL specifically, is the
obvious shortcoming with international law, belligerent reprisals may provide
a timely mechanism to redress enemy violations of IHL during the armed
conflict itself.11
The use of belligerent reprisal has evolved over time ³from a fundamental
and nearly universally recognized aspect of the international law´ regulating
warfare ³into a complex and [highly] contentious sanction.´12 Arguably, in
modern IHL, reprisals have been largely²but not entirely²prohibited by
customary and codified law. The 1977 Additional Protocols (AP) I13 is
XQTXHVWLRQDEO\ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\¶V VWURQJHVW DQG PRVW
comprehensive condemnation of belligerent reprisals as a method of warfare.
Commenting on the efforts that led to AP I, Konstantin Obradovic, who took
part in the Diplomatic Conference of 1974±1977 as a member of the Yugoslav
delegation, made the following observations about belligerent reprisals:
With its well-nigh absolute prohibition of reprisals against all
categories of protected persons who fall into enemy hands,
Protocol I goes further down the trail blazed in 1949. The
underlying considerations are both humanitarian and rational.
The history of war²and the Second World War in particular²
clearly shows that, apart from being barbarous, unfair and
inequitable as they invariably victimize the innocent, reprisals
achieve nothing. (YHQLIWKH\DUHµMXVWLILHG¶DVDUHVSRQVHWR
enemy violation of the law, they never result in the triumph of
the rule of law. Moreover, all the mass executions of the last
world war, all the Oradour-sur-Glane of this world have not
EHHQ HQRXJK WR GDPSHQ SHRSOH¶V GHWHUPLQDWLRQ WR UHVLVW
Reprisals therefore appear pointless.14
10. GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN
WAR 693 (2d ed. 2016) (quoting WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 496 (2010)).
11. A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 14 (2d ed. 2004). Importantly, reprisals are
separate and distinct from acts of retaliation and revenge, which remain unlawful under IHL.
GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE 19 (1980).
12. Sean Watts, Reciprocity and the Law of War, 50 HARV. INT¶L L.J. 365, 382 (2009).
13. Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Protocol I].
14. Konstantin Obradovic, The Prohibition of Reprisals in Protocol I: Greater Protection for
War
Victims,
INT¶L
REV.
RED
CROSS,
Oct.
31,
1997,
at
524,
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jnv7.htm [https://perma.cc/FY6JPF9P].
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While Obradovic expressed this view at the earliest period in the
development of cyber capabilities, the current and future state of reprisals in the
cyber realm require a review of more recent legal analysis. In that regard, a
useful starting point for legal practitioners, policymakers, non-governmental
organizations,15 cyber security professionals, military commanders, and
scholars is the 2017 Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to
Cyber Operations (Tallinn Manual 2.0).16 This resource, which is best
understood as the collective opinions of a group of international experts,
helpfully addresses the question of belligerent reprisals under IHL in armed
conflict as well as many other vital issues spanning public international law in
its nearly 600 pages of highly informative text.17 Impressively, Tallinn Manual
2.0 has 154 rules including two rules on reprisals: Rule 108, Belligerent
Reprisals, and Rule 109, Reprisals under Additional Protocol I.18 In addition
to the actual rules contained in Tallinn Manual 2.0, the manual provides
detailed commentary, offering some tremendously valuable insights into the
normative context of the rules as well as practical implications for their
application.19 Finally, and most importantly, it is important to note that the
experts who wrote Tallinn Manual 2.0 were limiting themselves to an objective
restatement of the lex lata and scrupulously avoided including statements
reflecting the lex ferenda.20
This article critically explores the legal landscape of belligerent reprisals
and considers whether the use of these measures is a viable enforcement
mechanism under IHL in the context of cyber operations. Because of the
layered approach to this inquiry, the article has seven parts that build upon each
other. Part II of the article provides an overview of the history of belligerent
reprisals under IHL. Part III discusses belligerent reprisals in the context of
WRGD\¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI,+/3DUW,9IXUWKHUH[SORUHVF\EHURSHUDWLRQVDQG
belligerent reprisals: the lex lata. Countermeasures (at one time known as
peacetime reprisals) under the law of state responsibility forms the basis of Part
V. Part VI provides an analytical framework for considering how cyber means

15. An example of one such non-governmental organization is the ICRC. The ICRC’s Mandate
and Mission, INT¶L COMM. RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/en/mandate-and-mission
[https://perma.cc/XQM3-32BJ] ODVW YLVLWHG 'HF     7KH ,&5& LV DQ ³LQGHSHQGHQW QHXWUDO
organization ensuring humanitarian protection and assistance for victims of armed conflict and other
situations of violence. It takes action in response to emergencies and at the same time promotes respect
IRULQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQLWDULDQODZDQGLWVLPSOHPHQWDWLRQLQQDWLRQDOODZ´Id.
16. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6.
17. See id.
18. Id. at 460±63.
19. Id. at 3±5.
20. Id. at 3.

2018] REVISITING BELLIGERENT REPRISALS IN THE AGE OF CYBER?

85

and methods could effectively facilitate an expanded use of belligerent reprisals
for some States under some conditions. Additionally, this section serves as the
lens for re-examining the propriety and practicality of breathing life back into
this controversial enforcement mechanism under IHL. Lastly, Part VII
summarizes and concludes the article.
II. THE HISTORY OF BELLIGERENT REPRISALS IN IHL
Reprisals have been the traditional method of enforcement of IHL since at
least the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.21 This time period saw a
number of advances in IHL including the adoption of the first Geneva
Convention; WKH 6W 3HWHUVEXUJ¶s Declaration, which renounced the use of
exploding bullets projectiles under 400 grams; and the drafting and
implementation of the so-called Lieber Code22 during the American Civil
War.23 The 1863 Lieber Code addressed the concept of reprisals throughout its
157 articles.24 1RWDEO\)UDQFLV/LHEHUWKH&RGH¶VPDLQDUFKLWHFWDQGGUDIWHU
GHVFULEHG ³UHWDOLDWLRQ´²which was used synonymously with the term
³UHSULVDOV´²as the sternest feature of war.25 Article 28 of the Code states:
Art. 28. Retaliation will, therefore, never be resorted to as a
measure of mere revenge, but only as a means of protective
retribution, and moreover, cautiously and unavoidably; that is
to say, retaliation shall only be resorted to after careful inquiry
into the real occurrence, and the character of the misdeeds that
may demand retribution. Unjust or inconsiderate retaliation
removes the belligerents farther and farther from the mitigating
rules of regular war, and by rapid steps leads them nearer to the
internecine wars of savages.26
During the American Civil War reprisals were a lawful method of enforcing
the laws and customs of war with both sides making abundant use of the
method.27 The Lieber Code even permitted retaliation against prisoners of war
21. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 514.
22. SOLIS, supra note 10, at 44±45. In 1862, the War Department appointed a board of officers,
LQFOXGLQJ)UDQFLV/LHEHUWRSURSRVHD³&RGHRI5HJXODWLRQVIRUWKHJRYHUQPHQWRIDUPLHVLQWKHILHOG´
Id. The military officers on the board worked primarily on a revision to the Articles of War. Id. Francis
Lieber, a professor at Columbia, wrote the Code that bears his name. Id. In 1863, President Lincoln
GLUHFWHG WKDW /LHEHU¶V -DUWLFOH &RGH EH LQFRUSRUDWHG LQWR WKH 8QLRQ $UP\¶V *HQHUDO 2UGHUV DV
³*HQHUDO2UGHU´Id.
23. Id. at 43.
24. See General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government Armies of the United States in
the Field (Apr. 24, 1863) [hereinafter Lieber Code].
25. Id. art.27.
26. Id. art.28.
27. Patryk I. Labuda, The Lieber Code, Retaliation and the Origins of International Criminal
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³>D@OOSULVRQHUVRIZDUDUHOLDEOHWRWKHLQIOLFWLRQRIUHWDOLDWRU\PHDVXUHV´ 28
In only the instance of later capture and execution of deserters joining an enemy
army did the Lieber Code forbid retaliation.29
'HVSLWHWKH/LHEHU&RGH¶VVWDWHPHQWRQWKHODZIXOQHVVRIUHSULVDOVRWKHU
legal bodies sought to limit the use of reprisals. The Brussels Conference of
1874 and the Institute of International Law meeting at Oxford in 1880 were two
such instances.30 7KH,QVWLWXWH¶V0DQXDORIWKH/DZVRI:DURQ/DQGVWDWHG
WKDW UHSULVDOV ³PXVW FRQIorm in all cases to the laws of humanity and
morality.´31 However, the Hague Conventions at the turn of the twentieth
century did not prohibit the use of belligerent reprisals apart from providing
some rudimentary protections for prisoners of war.32 In fact, during early armed
conflicts of the twentieth century, air attacks were a legitimate means and
method of reprisal against a defaulting enemy to bring it back to its senses.33
Commenting on this phenomenon, Air Commodore William Boothby stated:
The civilian population and the popular press would demand
retaliatory or reprisal action against the enemy in response to
air raids that occasioned civilian loss. Air raids carried out as
reprisal action could be portrayed by the adverse party as
simple illegal acts ignoring, of course, the alleged prior
illegality cited as justifying the reprisal in the first place.34
Reprisals in World War I caused much hardship for the victims of the
conflict and, in particular, prisoners of war. As a result, the idea of prohibiting
all reprisals against prisoners of war gained traction, eventually finding official
endorsement in special agreements concluded between parties to the conflict
Law, in 3 HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 299, 304, 306 (Morten Bergsmo
et al. eds., 2015).
28. Lieber Code, supra note 24, art.59.
29. Id. art.48. This provision specifically states:
Deserters from the American Army, having entered the service of the enemy,
suffer death if they fall again into the hands of the United States, whether by
capture, or being delivered up to the American Army; and if a deserter from the
enemy, having taken service in the Army of the United States, is captured by the
enemy, and punished by them with death or otherwise, it is not a breach against
the law and usages of war, requiring redress or retaliation.
Id.
30. See Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War,
Brussels, Aug. 27, 1874, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/135 [https://perma.cc/Q5VCQGC8]; The Laws of War on Land, Oxford, Sept. 9, 1880, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/140?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/M2FJ-AG3G].
31. The Laws of War on Land, supra note 30, art.86.
32. INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 301 (2d ed. 2000).
33. WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 512 (2012).
34. Id. at 512±13.
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towards the end of the war.35 Following World War I, the 1929 Geneva
Convention on Prisoners of War began the process of gradually excluding
groups of persons and FLYLOLDQV¶ SURSHUW\ from the scope of reprisals,36
including prisoners of war.37 Commenting on this particular category, Michael
Walzer, in his classic book Just and Unjust Wars, stated, ³SULVRQHUV ZHUH
singled out because of the implied contract by surrender, in which they are
promised life and benevolent quarantine. Killing them would be a breach of
IDLWKDVZHOODVDYLRODWLRQRIWKHSRVLWLYHODZVRIZDU´38
Despite these efforts, World War II saw the regular use of reprisals by the
parties to the conflict.39 There were a number of well-known incidents
involving reprisals including one involving the Germans and the French
resistance fighters in 1944.40 After the Normandy invasion, French resistance
fighters organized into the French Forces on the Interior (FFI) and began
operating openly and on a larger scale.41 They wore insignia visible at a
distance, carried their arms openly, and abided by the laws and customs of war,
thereby qualifying them as lawful combatants.42 However, the Germans did not
recognize the FFI as lawful combatants.43 Rather, the Germans viewed them
as criminals and summarily executed a number of FFI fighters upon capture.44
By the late summer of 1944, ³many German soldiers had surrendered to the
FFI.´45 When the FFI learned the Germans executed eighty FFI fighters and
planned to execute more, ³the FFI announced that it would carry out eighty
reprisal executions.´46 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

35. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=8F88DE5EE
5DEA183C12563CD0042207D [https://perma.cc/P7T2-57TR].
36. THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 234 (Dieter Fleck ed., 3d ed.
2013).
37. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, July 27, 1929, Art. 2,
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/ART/305-430003?OpenDocument
[https://perma.cc/244B-DFX9].
38. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL
ILLUSTRATIONS 209 (4th ed. 2006).
39. DETTER, supra note 32, at 301.
40. Kenneth Anderson, Reprisal Killings, in CRIMES OF WAR 2.0: WHAT THE PUBLIC SHOULD
KNOW 358, 358±59 (Roy Gutman, David Rieff & Anthony Dworkin eds., 2007).
41. Id. at 358.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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intervened and sought to postpone the executions pending an agreement
whereby the Germans would recognize the FFI as lawful combatants.47 But,
after six days in which the Germans did not respond, the FFI executed eighty
German prisoners.48 Subsequently, the historical accounts indicate the
Germans abandoned any plans to execute additional FFI prisoners.49
In addition to the actual use of reprisals by parties in World War II, there
was also the threatened use of belligerent reprisals. For example, President
Franklin Roosevelt threatened the use of retaliatory attacks upon becoming
aware that Axis forces sought to use poison gas.50 The regular use, or threat of
use, of belligerent reprisals in World War II thus became an important topic in
the post-war tribunals. Commenting about the scope of belligerent reprisals,
the International Military Tribunal found that:
The right of reprisals against civilians was restricted by rules
laid down in the judgments of the Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg. The Tribunal emphasised that reprisals must at
least be limited geographically to one area, mainly as action
against persons in one area could have little deterrent effect on
people in other areas. If there was not such geographical
FRQQHFWLRQDµIXQFWLRQDO¶OLQNPLJKWEHDFFHSWDEOHDVOLPLWLQJ
the right of reprisals: there had thus to be some connection
between the reprisals and the civilians against whom action
was taken. The Tribunal furthermore ruled out reprisals for
which certain ethnic, religious or political groups had been
selected.51
On August 12, 1949, a diplomatic conference in Geneva approved the text
of four conventions to which more States have ratified than any other
international agreements in the laws regulating armed conflict: the 1949

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Andrew D. Mitchell, Does One Illegality Merit Another? The Law of Belligerent Reprisals
in International Law, 170 MIL. L. REV. 155, 171 (2001). President Roosevelt specifically stated:
[T]here have been reports that one or more of the Axis powers were seriously
contemplating use of poisonous or noxious gases or other inhumane devices of
warfare. . . . We promise to any perpetrators of such crimes full and swift
retaliation in kind. . . . Any use of gas by any Axis power, therefore, will
immediately be followed by the fullest possible retaliation upon munition centers,
seaports, and other military objectives throughout the whole extent of the territory
of such Axis country.
Id. (alteration in original).
51. DETTER, supra note 32, at 301.
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Geneva Conventions.52 The Conventions were, in part, born out of the
unprecedented brutality and violence of World War II. 53 As Ambassador
George H. Aldrich commented:
The history of development of this branch of international law
is largely one of reaction to bad experience. After each major
war, the survivors negotiate rules for the next war that they
would, in retrospect, like to have seen in force during the last
war. The 1929 and 1949 Geneva Conventions attest to that
pattern.54
The four Conventions prohibited belligerent reprisals with respect to the
specific classes of individuals covered by each agreement: wounded, sick, and
shipwrecked; medical and religious personnel; prisoners of war; civilians in
occupied territories; as well as certain objects such as medical facilities and
supplies and private property of civilians in occupied territory.55 Adding to

52. ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 195 (3d ed.
2000). To provide some background and context, the Geneva Conventions may be traced back to a
well-to-do Swiss businessman, Henri Dunant, and the Battle of Solferino in 1859. Solferino and the
International
Committee
of
the
Red
Cross,
INT¶L
COMM.
RED
CROSS,
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/feature/2010/solferino-feature-240609.htm
[https://perma.cc/KC3E-SDEH] (last visited Jan. 3, 2018). The Battle of Solferino in Lombardy, not
far from Milan and Verona, was fought between the forces of Austria and a French-Piedmontese
alliance. Id. The battle was one of the bloodiest of the nineteenth century with thousands of dead and
wounded on both sides. Id. The military practice of the time was to leave the wounded where they had
fallen on the battlefield. Id. Dunant was there and witnessed the carnage and participated in the
aftermath attempting to provide aid and comfort to survivors. Id. Dunant could not forget what he saw
and experienced. Id. He published in 1862 a small book, A Memory of Solferino. Id. In the book,
Dunant vividly and graphically described the battle and the suffering of the wounded and injured
soldiers. Id. Additionally, in the book, Dunant called for the creation of relief societies in each country
that would act as auxiliaries to the army medical services to facilitate the care for all wounded and sick,
whichever side they were on. Id. This effort led eventually to the formation of the International
Committee of the Red Cross. Id  $OVR DV SDUW RI 'XQDQW¶V YLVLRQ LQ A Memory of Solferino, he
proposed that an international principle be created to serve as the basis for these societies. Id'XQDQW¶V
idea ultimately led to the Swiss government hosting an official diplomatic conference in August 1864,
which resulted in the adoption of the first Geneva Convention. Id. In 1901, Dunant was awarded the
first-HYHU 1REHO 3HDFH 3UL]H IRU ZKDW ZDV DFFXUDWHO\ GHVFULEHG DV WKH ³VXSUHPH KXPDQLWDULDQ
achievement of the 1WKFHQWXU\´Id.
53. See 3KLOOLS6SRHUUL'LURI,QW¶O/DZ,QW¶O&RPPRIWKH5HG&URVV$GGUHVVDW&HUHPRQ\
to Celebrate 60th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions: The Geneva Conventions of 1949: Origins
and
Current
Significance
(Dec.
8,
2009),
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/geneva-conventions-statement-120809.htm
[https://perma.cc/2QXP-FPQ8].
54. SOLIS, supra note 10, at 88.
55. THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 36, at 234, 334.
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these prohibitions, the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural
Property prohibited reprisals against objects protected under the convention.56
The 1977 AP I significantly enlarged the traditional prohibitions of reprisals
under IHL adding several other categories of prohibited reprisal targets.57 In
addition to a general prohibition, AP I also specifically prohibits reprisals
against the civilian population and objects; cultural property and places of
worship; objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian populations; the
natural environment; and works or installations containing dangerous forces.58
However, the United States, as well as several other States, objected to these
additional restrictions on reprisals as being counterproductive.59
6SHFLILFDOO\ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV DUJXHG $3 ,¶V JUHDWHU SURKLELWLRQ RQ
reprisals removed a significant tool for protecting civilians and war victims on
all sides of a conflict.60 )RUH[DPSOHDUWLFOHRIWKH3URWRFRO³SURKLELWVDQ\
reprisal attacks against the civilian population, that is, attacks that would
RWKHUZLVHEHIRUELGGHQEXWWKDWDUHLQUHVSRQVHWRWKHHQHP\¶VRZQYLRODWLRQV
of the ODZ DQG DUH LQWHQGHG WR GHWHU IXWXUH YLRODWLRQV´61 Yet, historically,
reprisals were the major sanction underlying the laws of war and ensured
reciprocal compliance.62 ³,IDUWLFOHZHUHWRFRPHLQWRIRUFHIRUWKH8QLWHG
States, an enemy could deliberately carry out attacks against friendly civilian
populations, and the United States would be legally forbidden to reply in
NLQG´63 $VDUHVXOW³>W@RIRUPDOO\UHQRXQFHHYHQWKHRSWLRQRIVXFKDWWDFNV´
ZRXOG³UHPRYHDVLJQLILFDQWGHWHUUHQW´IRUWKRVHLQWHQW on targeting unfriendly

56. Id. at 434; see also Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event
of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240, 244±48.
57. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 463.
58. Id.
59. GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH
  ,QIDFWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶s objections concerning reprisals was one of the reasons it did
not ratify AP I. See SOLIS, supra note 10, at 128±38; see also Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal
$GYLVHU86'HS¶WRI6WDWH5HPDUNVDW American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference
on International Humanitarian Law (Jan. 22, 1987), in 2 AM. U. J. INT¶L L. & POL¶Y 419, 426 (1987).
60. OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. DEP¶T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF
WAR MANUAL § 18.18.3.4, at 1088±89 (2016) [hereinafter LAW OF WAR MANUAL].
61. Id. § 18.18.3.4, at 1089 n.221 (quoting -XGJH$EUDKDP'6RIDHU/HJDO$GYLVHU86'HS¶W
of State, Remarks at American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on International
Humanitarian Law (Jan. 22, 1987), in 2 AM. U. J. INT¶L L. & POL¶Y 460, 469 (1987)).
62. See Watts, supra note 12, at 382.
63. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 60, § 18.18.3.4, at 1089 n.221 (quoting Sofaer, supra
note 61, at 469).
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civilian populations.64 Today, the United States continues to hold, as an option,
the use of reprisals in limited circumstances.65
III. BELLIGERENT REPRISALS TODAY IN IHL
As is evident from the above, the historical development of reprisals under
IHL established a gradual trend to outlaw the practice.66 There are, however,
several important considerations with respect to reprisals under the present IHL
framework. First, as a threshold matter, to the degree that a reprisal would be
lawful today, they are subject to stringent controls.67 Second, the concept of
belligerent reprisals exists in the context of international armed conflicts and
not in non-international armed conflicts.68 And third, under customary IHL,
there are six general conditions precedent to lawfully employing belligerent
reprisals.69
The first condition relates to the purpose of reprisals. 70 As mentioned
previously, the use of reprisals is only in reaction to a prior serious violation of
IHL and done for the purpose of inducing the enemy to comply with IHL.71 In
many respects, this is the sine qua non of reprisals, i.e., to induce a law-breaking
State to abide by IHL in the future.72 Of course, in practice, determining motive
for particular actions may be problematic. That is, it may be very difficult to
discern whether there is a legitimate purpose for an action, i.e., inducing an
adversary to comply with the law, or whether an act is actually retaliation,
retribution, or revenge.73 Additionally, because of the underlying purpose of
belligerent reprisals, anticipatory or counter reprisals are impermissible.74
The second condition is that the employment of belligerent reprisals is a
matter of last resort, and there must be no other lawful measures available to
induce the enemy to respect and comply with IHL.75 Before using reprisals,

64. Id. (quoting Sofaer, supra note 61, at 469).
65. See CORN ET AL., supra note 59, at 227.
66. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 513±14.
67. Id. at 513.
68. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 464. The ICRC, in Rule 148 of its Customary
International Law Study takes the position that parties to non-international armed conflicts do not have
the right to resort to belligerent reprisals. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 526.
69. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 515±18; see also LAW OF WAR MANUAL,
supra note 60, § 18.18.2.5, at 1086.
70. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 515.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 515±16.
73. BEST, supra note 11, at 167.
74. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 515.
75. Id. at 516.
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6WDWHVPXVWILUVWDWWHPSWWRVHFXUHWKHHQHP\¶VFRPSOLDQFHZLWK,+/WKURXJK
certain means.76 For example, actions such as ³protests and demands, retorsion,
or reasonable notice of the threat to use reprisals´ are necessary before resorting
to belligerent reprisals.77 Notably, both international and domestic courts
require meeting this condition prior to utilizing reprisals. 78
The third condition is proportionality.79 Proportionality has multiple
meanings in international law. Generally, within the context of customary IHL,
proportionality is understood to mean that an attack is prohibited if the
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or
a combination thereof, is ³excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated.´80 By contrast, in the context of belligerent
reprisals, most State practices illustrate that the acts taken in reprisal be
proportionate to the original violation, free from the balancing approach under
the prevalent proportionality notion.81
In practice, proportionality may be hard to gauge in nature and scope,
although it does not mean equivalence. Rather, it should be construed to mean
the response should not be excessive.82 Additionally, it is important to note that
the proportionality requirement does not mean that the belligerent reprisal
needs to be in kind.83 For example, if State A bombs civilian objects in State
B, State B is not limited to only bombing civilian objects in State A. In fact,
there are many scenarios where there is not a direct counterpart to the original
violation or the victim State may simply lack the technical expertise to respond
in the same fashion.84
The fourth condition is somewhat straightforward and self-explanatory.
Because reprisals are significant military and political acts that require careful
and complex judgments, the law withholds authority to exact reprisals to the
highest levels of government within a State.85 As noted by one legal
commentator about this unusual, but important condition:
Because of the extremely complex legal and political
assessment which must precede any reprisal, it is necessary
76. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT 221 (2004).
77. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 60, § 18.18.2.2, at 1085.
78. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 516.
79. Id. at 517.
80. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 60, § 2.4.1.2, at 61.
81. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 518.
82. DINSTEIN, supra note 76, at 221.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 518.
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that the political leadership of a belligerent state decide on any
possible use of reprisals. The exact legal nature of the adverse
EHOOLJHUHQW¶VDFWLRQVPD\EHH[WUHPHO\GLIILFXOWWRGHWHUPLQH
even more importantly, a decision to use reprisals requires a
genuine assessment of the political risks as well as the
immediate dangers connected with the use of a reprisal.86
The fifth condition is intuitive and consistent with the overarching purpose
of reprisals. Under this requirement, reprisal actions must immediately cease
as soon as the enemy complies with IHL.87 This condition is consistent with
and highlights the nature of reprisals as a deterrent measure. Finally, the sixth
condition prior to using reprisals is that in order to fulfil their purpose, dissuade
an adversary from further unlawful conduct, and to promote adherence to IHL,
States must announce the action and make it public.88
Beyond these six, strictly legal considerations, there are also several
practical consequences before resorting to the use of belligerent reprisals. First,
resorting to belligerent reprisals may ultimately divert valuable and scarce
military resources.89 Second, since belligerent reprisals are, by definition,
violations of international norms, other States may not only disagree with the
decision to use them, but also view their use as a violations of IHL and subject
to sanction.90 Third, it is very possible the use of reprisals may strengthen an
DGYHUVDU\¶VPRUDOHDQGZLOOWRUHVLVW91 Fourth, many observers view reprisals
DV D ³UDFH WR WKH ERWWRP´ OHDGLQJ WR D YLFLRXV F\FOH RI FRXQWHU-reprisals.92
Finally, like other serious violations of IHL, the use of belligerent reprisals may
exacerbate tensions between the parties to the conflict making it more difficult
for them to end the armed conflict and return to a peaceful state.93 Given the
legal framework as outlined above, coupled with a number of compelling
practical considerations, belligerent reprisals are seemingly a waning IHL
enforcement mechanism. Yet, the New Age of Cyber is challenging many
seemingly settled areas of international law and therefore it is worth discussing
the validity of belligerent reprisals during cyber operations.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 36, at 228.
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 518.
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 60, § 18.18.2.5, at 1086.
Id. § 18.18.4, at 1090.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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IV. CYBER OPERATIONS AND BELLIGERENT REPRISALS: THE LEX LATA
As a starting point, when thinking about the lex lata, it is important to
reiterate that the applicable IHL treaties were drafted before cyberspace and
operations were a reality.94 Likewise, there are many challenges associated
with the emergence of customary IHL cyber-related norms with the most
notable being the highly classified nature of cyber activities by States.95
However, it is also important to note, as discussed above, it is widely accepted
that IHL applies to cyber operations in the context of an armed conflict.96 With
that said, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 Rules and Commentary provide a valuable
resource and assist in identifying issues, gaps, and ambiguities in the law. But,
when thinking about the lex lata, it is always important to be mindful of whether
application of traditional rules of IHL make sense when applied in the cyber
context.
This acknowledgment includes the possible use of belligerent reprisals with
Rule 108 of Tallinn Manual 2.0, which provides basic parameters for use during
cyber operations in an international armed conflict. The Rule notes that
EHOOLJHUHQWUHSULVDOVDUHH[SUHVVO\SURKLELWHGDJDLQVW³prisoners of war; interned
civilians, civilians in occupied territory or otherwise in the hands of an adverse
party to the conflict, and their property; those hors de combat; and medical and
UHOLJLRXV SHUVRQQHO IDFLOLWLHV YHKLFOHV DQG HTXLSPHQW´97 In other
FLUFXPVWDQFHV ZKHUH LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ GRHV QRW SURKLELW XVH ³EHOOLJHUHQW
UHSULVDOVDUHVXEMHFWWRVWULQJHQWFRQGLWLRQV´98
The Commentary to Rule 108 provides granularity into the expertV¶
conclusions concerning belligerent reprisals. The experts state, unequivocally,
that cyber reprisals are prohibited against the wounded, sick, or shipwrecked;
medical personnel, units, establishments, or transports; chaplains; prisoners of
war, or interned civilians and civilians in the hands of an adverse party who are
protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention, or their property.99 In effect, these
prohibitions are customary international law that binds all States. However, the

94. DINNISS, supra note 8, at 239, 241.
95. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 377.
96. Id. at 3. When one thinks of the use of cyber in the context of an armed conflict, it involves
not only the employment of cyber capabilities to objectives in and through cyberspace, but also
involves requirements such as weapons reviews to ensure that cyber means of warfare that are acquired
or used complies with the law of armed conflict. Id. at 375; Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, The
Emergence of International Legal Norms for Cyberconflict, in BINARY BULLETS: THE ETHICS OF
CYBERWARFARE 34, 49 (Fritz Allhoff, Adam Henschke & Bradley Jay Strauser eds., 2016).
97. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 460.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 461.
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experts disagreed as to whether customary international law protected cultural
property.100
Further outlining the proper use of belligerent reprisals in the cyber context,
DQGSDUWLFXODUO\KRZ$3,¶VJUHDWHUSURKLELWLRQVDSSO\LV5XOHRITallinn
2.0. The Rule, rooted in seven different provisions found in AP I, states:
Additional Protocol I prohibits States Parties from making the
civilian population, individual civilians, civilian objects,
cultural property and places of worship, objects indispensable
to the survival of the civilian population, the natural
environment, and dams, dykes, and nuclear electrical
generating stations the object of a cyber-attack by the way of
reprisal.101
The commentary to Rule 109 expands on the general prohibition of cyber
reprisals against the aforementioned categories by those States that are parties
to AP I and engaged in an international armed conflict.102 But, the commentary
suggests the prohibition is conditional for certain States that adopted
understandings during the ratification of AP I. 103 And, despite certain
international tribunals holding reprisals against civilians a violation of
FXVWRPDU\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ WKLV SUDFWLFH KDV \HW WR ³FU\VWDOlise´ LQWR D
customary rule due to contrary practice.104 Nevertheless, in substance, the
Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts found that AP I dramatically reduces the use of
reprisals in cyber operations by limiting use to only against enemy armed
forces, their facilities, and equipment.105
Tallinn Manual 2.0¶V 5XOH , Rule 109, and associated commentary
provide an excellent summary of the current law concerning belligerent
reprisals in the cyber context. Clearly, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 agrees that
belligerent reprisals have limited use in the contemporary environment as an
IHL enforcement mechanism. However, a comparison between belligerent
reprisals and the concept of countermeasures under international law may
indicate it is time to revisit this determination in the New Age of Cyber. It is
important to note that such an intellectual and academic thought experiment,
i.e., comparing countermeasures and belligerent reprisals, should not be taken
to conflate or confuse these two distinct enforcement mechanisms under
international law. They are very different. The common ground between the

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 463.
Id.
Id. at 463±64.
Id.
Id. at 464.
CORN ET AL., supra note 59, at 227. See generally KOLB & HYDE, supra note 4, at 195.
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two is in their underlying purpose and that alone warrants the comparison
below.
V. COUNTERMEASURES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
In the first half of the twentieth century, so-called countermeasures were
referred to as ³peacetime reprisals.´106 Although belligerent reprisals and
countermeasures apply under different circumstances, their purpose is
fundamentally the same: to force a State that violates international law to
discontinue illegal activity.107 In this respect, countermeasures provide a good
point of comparison with belligerent reprisals.
As a threshold matter, it is important to note that States are responsible for
their internationally wrongful acts under the law of State responsibility.108
$UWLFOHRIWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ&RPPLVVLRQ¶V Articles of State Responsibility
for Internationally Wrongful Acts109 provides as follows:
Article 2
Elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when
conduct consisting of an action or omission:
(a) is attributable to the State under international law; and
(b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the
State.110
106. Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Activities and the Law of Countermeasures, in PEACETIME
REGIME FOR STATE ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE: INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
AND DIPLOMACY 659, 662 (Katharina Ziolkowski ed., 2013). The term peacetime is no longer used.
107. Id. at 661±62.
108. Id. at 661.
109. ,QW¶O/DZ&RPP¶Q5HSRQWKH:RUNRI,WV)LIW\-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, (2001),
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/ [https://perma.cc/9838-MCGV] [hereinafter Articles on State
Responsibility]. Beginning in 1956, the Articles of State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful
Acts were drafted over decades by the International Law Commission. The 59 Articles are divided
into four parts: Part One (The Internationally Wrongful Act of the State, articles 1±27); Part Two
(Content of the International Responsibility of a State, articles 28±41); Part Three (The Implementation
of the International Responsibility of a State, articles 42±54); and Part Four (articles 55±59) contains
the final five General Provisions of the text. Although the Articles are not binding, they are
authoritative because the International Law Commission developed them over decades under the
leadership of multiple special rapporteurs. Schmitt, supra note 106, at 661.
110. James Crawford, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION¶S ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 81 (2002). As noted in the commentary
WR$UWLFOHWKHHOHPHQWRIDWWULEXWLRQLVVRPHWLPHVGHVFULEHGDV³VXEMHFWLYH´ZKLOHWKHHOHPHQWRID
EUHDFKLVUHIHUUHGWRDV³REMHFWLYH´see Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 109, at 34.
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The breach of an international obligation may consist of a violation of a
treaty, customary international law, or of general principles of law.111 For
example, internationally wrongful acts may include a cyber operation that
violates the sovereignty of another State or the principle of non-intervention
among other things. 112 A well-known recent example of an international
wrongful act involved the Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential
election.113 $FFRUGLQJ WR 3URIHVVRU 0LFKDHO 6FKPLWW ³5XVVLD¶V DSSDUHQW
attempt to influence the outcome of the election by its release of emails through
WikiLeaks probably violates the international law barring intervention in a
VWDWH¶VLQWHUQDODIIDLUV´114 Another example may be a State that conducts cyber
operations against a coastal State from a ship located in the territorial waters of
the injured State. These actions would breach international law proscribing
innocent passage found in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea.115
One possible consequence for a state that chooses to commit an
international wrongful act is entitling a targeted state to resort to
countermeasures.116 ³&RXQWHUPHDVXUHV DUH DFWLRQV E\ DQ LQMXUHG 6WDWH WKDW
EUHDFKREOLJDWLRQVRZHGWRWKHµUHVSRQVLEOH¶6WDWH WKHRQHLQLWLDOO\YLRODWLQJLWV
legal obligations) in order to persuade the latter to return to a state of
ODZIXOQHVV´117 Countermeasures are therefore different than either a retorsion
or a plea of necessity. Retorsions are actions taken by a State that are best

111. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 109, at 35.
112. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 312±13.
113. See Russian Hacking and Influence in the U.S. Election, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/news-event/russian-election-hacking [https://perma.cc/3FFS-PADV] (last
visited Apr. 3, 2018).
114. Ellen Nakashima, Russia’s Apparent Meddling in U.S. Election is Not an Act of War, Cyber
Expert
Says,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
7,
2017),
www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/02/07/russias-apparent-meddling-in-u-selection-is-not-an-act-of-war-cyber-expert-says/?utm_term=.0e23dfb985de [https://perma.cc/SU9QMYGM].
115. Schmitt, supra note 106, at 664±65.
116. See ,QW¶O/DZ&RPP¶Q5HSRQWKH:RUNRI,WV)LIW\-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/58/10, at
75 (2003), http://www.un.org/law/ilc/ [https://perma.cc/57YV-NKTX] [hereinafter Articles on State
5HVSRQVLELOLW\ ,,@ ³7KH ZURQJIXOQHVV RI DQ DFW RI D 6WDWH QRW LQ FRQIRUPLW\ ZLWK DQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO
obligation towards another State is precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes a
FRXQWHUPHDVXUHWDNHQDJDLQVWWKHODWWHU6WDWHLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKFKDSWHU,,RI3DUW7KUHH´ 
117. Michael Schmitt, International Law and Cyber Attacks: Sony v. North Korea, JUST
SECURITY (Dec. 17, 2014), http://justsecurity.org/18460/international-humanitarian-law-cyberattacks-sony-v-north-korea/ [https://perma.cc/CN2H-5JRZ]; see also TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra
QRWHDW GHVFULELQJFRXQWHUPHDVXUHVDV³DFWLRQVRURPLVVLRQVE\DQLQMXUHG State [in response to
internationally wrongful acts] directed against a responsible State that would violate an obligation
RZHGE\WKHIRUPHUWRWKHODWWHU´ 
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described as unfriendly, but not inconsistent with an international obligation of
a State.118 An example includes limitations upon normal diplomatic relations
or other contacts, embargos of various kinds, or withdrawal of voluntary aid
programs.119 A plea of necessity, on the other hand, denotes exceptional cases
where a State, faced with grave and imminent peril to an essential interest, takes
measures counter to its international obligations to safeguard those particular
interests.120 In the cyber context, an example of the circumstances leading to a
plea of necessity may involve a cyEHU RSHUDWLRQ DJDLQVW D 6WDWH¶V FULWLFDO
infrastructure.121 In contrast to either a retorsion or a plea of necessity, a
FRXQWHUPHDVXUH DOORZV ³D VWDWH YLFWLPL]HG E\ DQRWKHU . . . to use acts
traditionally prohibited under international law to force the offending state to
FRPSO\ZLWKWKHLUOHJDOREOLJDWLRQV´122
In describing countermeasures in a cyber context, Professor William Banks
FRPPHQWHGWKDW³>F@RXQWHUPHDVXUHVDUHUHVSRQVHVZKHWKHUcyber in nature or
not, below the use of force threshold designed to prevent or mitigate a
SHUSHWUDWRU6WDWHIURPFRQWLQXLQJLWVXQODZIXOF\EHULQWHUYHQWLRQ´123 In this
regard, countermeasures are similar to belligerent reprisals in that they allow a
State to act unlawfully in order to force international legal compliance.124 Of
course there are differences between the two²countermeasures only apply
below the use of force threshold, are limited in severity,125 and must not involve
the threat or use of force126²whereas belligerent reprisals only apply during an
international armed conflict and would otherwise violate IHL but for a prior
illegal act.127 Nevertheless, despite these differences, countermeasures provide

118. Schmitt, supra note 117.
119. Id.
120. DINNISS, supra note 8, at 102.
121. Schmitt, supra note 106, at 663.
122. Daniel Garrie & Shane R. Reeves, So You’re Telling Me There’s a Chance: How the
Articles on State Responsibility Could Empower Corporate Responses to State-Sponsored Cyber
Attacks, HARV. NAT¶L SECURITY J. ONLINE FEATURES 5 (2015), http://harvardnsj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/Garrie-and-Reeves-Non-State-Actor-and-Self-Defense.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SY6X-W7PR].
123. William Banks, State Responsibility and Attribution of Cyber Intrusions After Tallinn 2.0,
95 TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1501 (2017).
124. Schmitt, supra note 106, at 662. As noted by Professor Schmitt, the idea of a reprisal was
also thought of in a jus ad bellum FRQWH[W7KDWLV³>W@KHKLVWRULFDOQRWLRQRIUHSULVDOVZDVEURDGHU
than that of countermeasures in that it included both non-forceful and forceful actions. Today, forceful
reprisals have been subVXPHGLQWRWKH81&KDUWHU¶VXVHRIIRUFHSDUDGLJPZKLFKDOORZV6WDWHVWR
UHVRUWWRIRUFHLQUHVSRQVHWRDUPHGDWWDFNV´Id.
125. Articles on State Responsibility II, supra note 116, at 129.
126. Id. at 131. See generally TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 38.
127. Schmitt, supra note 106, at 662.
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a valuable lens by which to view belligerent reprisals in the context of cyber
operations. Accordingly, there are four features of countermeasures worth
highlighting: (1) the purpose of countermeasures; (2) restrictions or limitations
on their use; (3) proportionality; and (4) attribution standards.
The purpose of a countermeasure is to return a situation to a condition of
lawfulness128 by inducing a State, who is responsible for internationally
wrongful acts, to comply with its obligations and where appropriate make
assurances or guarantees and reparations. Rule 21 of Tallinn Manual 2.0
further speaks to the purpose of countermeasures in the context of cyber. It
SURYLGHVWKDW³>F@RXQWHUPHDVXUHVZKHWKHUF\EHULQQDWXUHRUQRWPD\RQO\EH
taken to induce a responsible State to comply with the legal obligations it owes
an LQMXUHG 6WDWH´129 Furthermore, by definition, countermeasures are a
reactive, remedial, self-help measure necessitated by a lack of a compulsory
dispute resolution mechanism, and are a product of a decentralized system by
which an aggrieved State may seek to vindicate its rights and restore a proper
legal relationship with the responsible State.130
It is important to note, however, that countermeasures are not intended as
punishment.131 Yet, like other forms of self-help, countermeasures are subject
to abuse, especially between States of unequal power.132 And, similar to
belligerent reprisals, it may be difficult to distinguish the precise motive for
pursuing the countermeasure. In other words, a pertinent question is whether
countermeasures exacted against a State are being done to induce the State, who
is responsible for internationally wrongful acts, to comply, or is it being done
in retaliation, retribution, or revenge? In answering this question, if the
countermeasure will only exacerbate a situation, it is likely a fair indication the
motive may be rooted more in retaliation.133
The second inquiry involves restrictions on the use of countermeasures.
The most significant restriction stems from the use of force as proscribed by

128. Id. at 674.
129. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 116. Speaking to the underlying mind set of
FRXQWHUPHDVXUHV³VKRXOGEHDZDJHURQWKHZLVGRPQRWRQWKHZHDkness of the other Party. They
should be used with a spirit of great moderation and be accompanied by a genuine effort at resolving
WKHGLVSXWH´Case Concerning the Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 Between the United States
of America and France, 18 U.N. REP. INT¶L ARBITRAL AWARDS 417, 445. One particular risk in the
context of cyber is the speed at which cyber operations may unfold, both intentionally wrongful acts
and countermeasures, may detract from careful consideration of intent and consequences.
130. Schmitt, supra note 106, at 662; DINNISS, supra note 8, at 281.
131. Schmitt, supra note 106, at 674.
132. Id.
133. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 117.
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Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.134 Articles 49 and 50 of the Articles
of State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts further define the
limits of the legal boundaries on the use of countermeasures.135 Under Article
FRQVWUDLQWVH[LVWRQDFRXQWHUPHDVXUH¶VREMHFWDQGSXUSRVHDQGDUHOLPLWHG
to the responsible State¶s period of non-performance of its international
obligations.136 Additionally, as far as possible, countermeasures must be taken
in such a way to permit the resumption of performance of the obligation in
question.137 Article 50 expands on the foregoing by specifying a number of
international obligations the performance of which may not be impaired by
countermeasures.138 Drawing from Article 50, Tallinn Manual 2.0, Rule 22
SURYLGHV WKDW ³>F@RXQWHUPHDVXUHV ZKHWKHU F\EHU LQ QDWXUH RU QRW PD\ QRW
include actions that affect fundamental human rights, amount to prohibited
belligerent reprisals, or violate peremptory norm. A State taking
countermeasures must fulfil its obligations with respect to diplomatic and
FRQVXODULQYLRODELOLW\´139
The third inquiry when considering the use of countermeasures involves the
notion of proportionality.140 Article 51 of the Articles of State Responsibility
SURYLGHV WKDW ³>F@RXQWHUPHDVXUHs must be commensurate with the injury141
suffered, taking into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and
WKH ULJKWV LQ TXHVWLRQ´142 0XFK OLNH WKH ³SXUSRVH´ RI FRXQWHUPHDVXUHV
134. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. This provision also reflects customary international law. As noted
by Professor Schmitt, the dilemma lies in determining when a cyber operation qualifies as a use of
force thereby making it impermissible as a countermeasure. See Schmitt, supra note 106, at 678.
135. Articles on State Responsibility II, supra note 116, at 129±34.
136. Id. at 129.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 131.
139. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 122±23.
140. It is important to note that proportionality with respect to countermeasures is separate and
distinct from the concept of proportionality in jus ad bellum or IHL. With respect to jus ad bellum, the
concept of proportionality considers the degree of force necessary for a State to defend itself against
an armed attack. In that context, proportionality serves to identify the circumstances in which the
unilateral use of force is permissible under international law. Additionally, it also serves to determine
the intensity and the magnitude of military operations. In the context of IHL, proportionality means
essentially whether an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if the attack may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof.
See Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 51, at 37, art. 57, at 41±42.
141. Articles of State Responsibility II, supra QRWHDW³,QMXU\´PHDQVDEUHDFKRIDQ
international legal obligation. It should not be understood to require damage. See TALLINN MANUAL
2.0, supra note 6, at 127.
142. Articles of State Responsibility II, supra note 116, at 134; DINNISS, supra note 8, at 103±
04. The principle of proportionality is a deeply rooted requirement for countermeasures and is widely
recognized in State practice, doctrine and international jurisprudence. For example, in the Naulilaa
FDVHXVLQJWKHZRUG³UHSULVDO,´WKHFRXUWVWDWHG³(YHQLIRQHDGPLWWHGWKDWLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZGRHVQRW
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proportionality is also an essential limitation on the injured State in terms of the
employment of specific countermeasures and the level of their intensity.143 A
countermeasure that is disproportionate amounts to an impermissible
punishment or retaliation, and is contrary to the object and purpose of
countermeasures.144 A proportionality analysis provides a check on the
potentially escalating effect of countermeasures and is a control on the exercise
of ³decentralized power conferred on States to react individually to
international wrongful acts.´145 However, it is important to note that
proportionality does not mean or imply reciprocity.146 In fact, it is entirely
lawful to use non-cyber countermeasures in responses to an internationally
wrongful act involving cyber operations.147
In the context of cyber, it is feasible to narrowly tailor the intensity,
duration, and effects of the operation. For example, a cyber operation aimed at
incapacitating infrastructure without destroying it may be particularly useful in
meeting the limitations on countermeasures, including proportionality.148
Noting the challenges of assessing proportionality in the context of
countermeasures, Tallinn Manual 2.0 states, in part:
The interconnected and interdependent nature of cyber systems
can render it difficult to determine accurately the consequences
likely to result from cyber countermeasures. States must
therefore exercise considerable care when assessing whether
their countermeasures will be proportionate. Conducting a full
assessment may require, for instance, mapping the targeted
system or reviewing relevant intelligence. Whether the
assessment is adequate depends on the foreseeability of
potential consequences and the feasibility of means that can be
used to conduct it.149
The final issue with respect to countermeasures concerns attribution. The
issue of attribution includes more than technically determining the source of the
require that the reprisal be approximately measured by the offense, one should certainly consider as
excessive, and thus illegal, reprisals out of all proportion with the act which motivDWHGWKHP´Naulilaa
Incident Arbitration, Portuguese-German Arbitral Tribunal, 1928, reprinted and translated in
WILLIAM W. BISHOP, JR., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 903, 904 (3d ed. 1971).
143. DINNISS, supra note 8, at 104.
144. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 127.
145. JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 698 (James Crawford &
John S. Bell eds., 2013).
146. See DINNISS, supra note 8, at 104.
147. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 128.
148. MARCO ROSCINI, CYBER OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
106 (2014).
149. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 128.
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attack. It also includes policy and legal issues. The difficulties in attributing
cyber-attacks and determining the identity of the perpetrators causes a
perception that States can operate with virtual impunity in the cyber realm.150
The various tools, tactics, and techniques available to conceal cyber activities
compounds the challenges to attribute attacks to States, non-State actors, or
individuals.151 For example, a responsible State may gain ³control of another
6WDWH¶VF\EHULQIUDVWUXFWXUHDQGXVHLWWRPRXQWharmful´ attacks against a third
State.152 This situation illustrates the technical complexities that exist in the
cyber domain. While future technological innovations may mitigate the
attribution obstacle, ³as with any forensic investigation, information gathering´
in cyberspace is likely to remain technically challenging, time consuming, and
resource intensive.153
While ascertaining the source of a cyber-attack remains problematic, some
influential thought leaders have challenged the paradigmatic thinking that
discovering the point of attack and those individuals responsible is necessary
for the purpose of attribution.154 Proponents of this concept disagree that once
the technical forensics of the attack is established only then can attribution hope
to determine the person or organization responsible for it.155 Instead, they
conceptualize the problem of attribution as one to consider in the light of this
question: What do national policy leaders actually need to know about the cyber
operation?156 In answering this question, national leaders should simply know
who is ultimately responsible for the attack rather than who actually committed
the acts.
An example of this distinction between determining responsibility versus
identifying the actual perpetrators occurred in 1999 when NATO inadvertently
bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the armed conflict in
Kosovo.157 In the aftermath of the tragedy, scores of people gathered in Beijing
near the U.S. Embassy, including many students bused in for the protests.158

150. Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Proxy Wars in Cyberspace: The Evolving International
Law of Attribution, FLETCHER SECURITY REV., Spring 2014, at 53, 54 (2014).
151. Schmitt, supra note 106, at 685.
152. Id.
153. Louise Arimatsu, Classifying Cyber Warfare, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CYBERSPACE 326, 333 (Nicholas Tsagourias & Russell Buchan eds.,
2015).
154. Jason Healy, The Spectrum of National Responsibility for Cyberattacks, BROWN J. WORLD
AFF., Fall/Winter 2011, at 57, 57 (2011).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 58.
158. Id.
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Despite protesters pummeling the U.S. Embassy with bricks and rocks,159 U.S.
authorities did not seek to identify the individual stone throwers ³because the
exact attribution was not an important input for decision makers.´160 The
United States knew that the Chinese were responsible for attacks regardless of
who threw the individual rocks.161 Even though knowing who actually threw
the rocks would provide many data points, that information would not be
particularly helpful to deciding how to respond to the incident.162 Similarly,
with cyber-attacks, it is often not necessarily probative who actually initiated
the attack at the lowest technical level.163 Instead, the most important
determination is who is overall responsible. In sum, reconceptualizing the
concept of attribution may serve to provide decision-makers with flexibility to
respond in the complex domain of cyber.164
Countermeasures have become an important tool, even if not used, for
States to force compliance with international law in cyber space below the use
of force threshold.165 Taking the foregoing background into consideration,
countermeasures are, in many respects, the other side of the belligerent reprisal
coin. It is therefore worth asking whether belligerent reprisals may serve an
equally useful purpose as countermeasures when addressing cyber operations
in the international armed conflict context.

159. Chinese in Belgrade, Beijing Protest NATO Embassy Bombing, CNN (May 9, 1999, 9:44
PM), http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9905/09/china.protest.03/ [https://perma.cc/E6EGQQZF].
160. Healy, supra note 154, at 58.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 57.
164. Attribution also presents challenging legal and factual issues. For example, what are the
evidentiary considerations when using countermeasures? The Commentary to the Articles on State
Responsibility suggest the standard for factual attribution is identification with responsible certainty,
see Schmitt, supra note 106, at 685, and, importantly, only States may use countermeasures. TALLINN
MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 130. This restriction thus precludes private firms, like Sony for instance,
IURPHQJDJLQJLQ³KDFN-EDFN´FRXQWHUPHDVXUHVDJDLQVWNorth Korea after a cyber-attack in 2014. See
generally David E. Sanger, David D. Kirkpatrick & Nicole Perlroth, The World Once Laughed at North
Korean
Cyberpower.
No
More.,
N.Y.
(Oct.
15,
2017),
TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/15/world/asia/north-korea-hacking-cyber-sony.html
[https://perma.cc/985U-TXV8]. But see generally Garrie & Reeves, supra note 122, at 13 (discussing
a possible way for a corporation to use countermeasures).
165. See, e.g., Nakashima, supra note 114 (noting that the United States most likely has grounds
to use countermeasures against Russia for the 2016 election hacking actions) (quoting Professor
Michael Schmitt).
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VI. BELLIGERENT REPRISALS AND CYBER: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, one of the leading international lawyers of the
WZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\REVHUYHGWKDW³>L@ILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZLVLQVRPHZD\VDWWKH
vanishing point of law, the law of war is, perhaps even more conspicuously, at
WKH YDQLVKLQJ SRLQW RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´166 $W VRPH OHYHO /DXWHUSDFKW¶V
insightful remarks are not surprising in that IHL is attempting to regulate the
worst of human conditions²war. International Humanitarian Law seeks to
introduce moderation and restraint into a pursuit defined by violence and death,
unbridled passion and hatred, as well as confusion and unpredictability. At its
best, IHL is never more than imperfectly observed, and at its worst, very poorly
observed.167 Commenting on the effectiveness of the jus in bello, distinguished
British historian Geoffrey Best stated, ³>Z@H VKRXOG SHUKDSs not so much
complain that the law of war does not work well, as marvel that it works at
DOO´168 Unquestionably, Best is absolutely correct in his assessment. Yet,
beyond the substance and circumstances of what IHL attempts to regulate, there
is another factor that places international law generally, and IHL specifically,
DWWKH³YDQLVKLQJSRLQWRIODZ´²anemic enforcement mechanisms.
The challenges in enforcing and implementing norms are a significant
reason why international law faces enduring criticism. Arguably, meaningful
HQIRUFHPHQWLVWKH$FKLOOHVKHHORIWKLVDUHDRIODZHVSHFLDOO\LI³ODZ´LVWKH
commands of a sovereign backed by sanctions as articulated by legal positivists
from Hobbes to Austin.169 Furthermore, critics have long contended the
intractable problem of meaningful enforcement and sanctions in international
law not only undermines the effectiveness and credibility of the international
QRUPDWLYHV\VWHPEXWDOVRVXJJHVWVZKHWKHULQWHUQDWLRQDOODZLV³ODZ´DWDOOLI
it cannot be imposed.170 Even then, one has to be careful not to overstate the
problem and place international law in the proper context:
The international situation cannot be equated to the situation
within states. There is not a powerful international body that
has authority over the subjects of the law; the international
community does not have an international police force and a
166. BEST, supra note 11, at 12.
167. Id. at 11.
168. Id. at 12.
169. Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law,
Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1822 (2009).
170. Elena Katselli Proukaki, The Problem of Enforcement in International Law:
Countermeasures, the Non-Injured State and the Idea of International Community, INT¶L L. OBSERVER
(May 18, 2010, 11:23 AM), http://www.internationallawobserver.eu/2010/05/18/the-problem-ofenforcement-in-international-law-countermeasures-the-non-injured-state-and-the-idea-ofinternational-community [https://perma.cc/S9UZ-6EW6].
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judiciary with compulsory jurisdiction; thus, coercive power
exercised by the international community cannot be relied
upon to enforce international obligations. The sovereignty and
equality of states precludes the operation of such mechanisms,
and ensures that the execution of the law is precarious and,
sometimes, irregular.171
Although difficulties exist in enforcing IHL, there are some mechanisms
for enforcement including protecting powers,172 fact finding commissions,173
penal sanctions,174 and reparations.175 But, challenges still remain. The absence
of a hierarchical system or institution capable of enforcement, implementation,
and accountabilLW\IXQGDPHQWDOO\SUHFOXGHV,+/¶VGHFHQWUDOL]HGFKDUDFWHUIURP
undergoing meaningful change in the foreseeable future. So, how should the
international community respond when confronted with the realities of
international law? Do advances in technology provide an opportunity to better
promote lawfulness on the modern battlefield? In the context of cyber and the
emergence of new capabilities, revisiting belligerent reprisals provides a means
to overcome the obvious challenges underlying the enforcement of IHL.
One way to conceptualize or consider the issue of belligerent reprisals is to
think of them as three points on a left-to-right continuum. At the far left end of
the continuum, the first category, are belligerent reprisals that should never

171. KOLB & HYDE, supra note 4, at 283.
172. 8QGHU,+/D³SURWHFWLQJSRZHU´LVDQHXWUDOWKLUG-party State designated as a party to the
conflict and accepted by the enemy party. This State has agreed to carry out the functions assigned to
a protecting Power under IHL. These functions include monitoring and ensure compliance with the
law. In the absence of an agreement, the ICRC or any other impartial humanitarian organization may
designate a protecting power substitute. Notably, the use of this system is rare in recent years. See
Protecting Powers: How Does the Law Protect in War?, INT¶L COMM. RED CROSS,
https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/protecting-powers [https://perma.cc/CZ47-2G5G] (last visited Jan.
26, 2018).
173. Article 90 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I provides for the establishment of an
International Fact-Finding Commission. Established in 1991, it is a permanent body of 15 independent
H[SHUWVDFWLQJLQWKHLUSHUVRQDOFDSDFLW\7KH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSXUSose is to contribute to implementation
of and ensure respect for IHL in armed conflicts. Thilo Marauhn, The International Humanitarian Fact
Finding Commission—Dedicated to Facilitating Respect for International Humanitarian Law, INT¶L
HUMANITARIAN FACT-FINDING COMM¶N, www.ihffc.org/index.asp?Language=EN&page=home
[https://perma.cc/8YXN-9DHV] (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).
174. International Humanitarian Law is enforceable in both domestic courts and international
tribunals. Over the last three decades there has been significant efforts internationally to prosecute war
crimes in ad hoc tribunals like the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda as well as the International Criminal Court.
175. HUMA HAIDER, GSDRC, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR HUMANITARIAN
ACTION: TOPIC GUIDE 49 (2013), http://www.gsdrc.org/topic-guides/international-legal-frameworksfor-humanitarian-action/challenges/compliance-with-and-enforcement-of-ihl/
[https://perma.cc/FF3Z-XKFX].

106

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[102:81

occur regardless of the motive, means, or method. For example, belligerent
reprisals against persons under the control of a party to the conflict should never
be the target of a reprisal. As a representative list, this would include the
following category of individuals: ³prisoners of war; interned civilians,
civilians in occupied territory or otherwise in the hands of an adverse party to
the conflict, and their property; those hors de combat; and medical and religious
personnel, facilities, vehicles, and equipment.´176
This first category also contains certain objects immune as targets of
reprisals, including medical buildings, vessels, or equipment; works or
installations containing dangerous forces; objects indispensable to the survival
of the civilian population; and cultural property and places of worship.177
Furthermore, the belligerent reprisals continuum precludes the use of chemical
or biological weapons.178 Certain cyber operations that would fit into the above
category include opening the flood gates of a dam causing the release of a body
of water capable of widespread destruction; or, using a cyber-attack to target a
hospital by turning off its electricity or taking some action to remotely taint the
food or water supply for the civilian population.
There are a number of reasons to categorically exclude the foregoing
belligerent reprisals. First, attacking these persons and objects are simply too
inhumane and barbaric. If IHL seeks to balance between the meta-principles
of military necessity and humanity, the above egregious and irreversible acts
may never been offset by necessity. The second reason goes to the underlying
purpose of belligerent reprisals, i.e., to induce an adversary to comply with IHL.
The above examples will likely cause an escalation in violence by inflaming
passions and resentments, leading additional violations of IHL and continued
hostilities. Third, using countermeasures as an analogy, these actions are
neither reversible nor likely to induce a return to lawfulness. Instead, the
harshness of the acts make them more analogues to punishments and retaliation,
and whether exacted in the cyber realm or not, these belligerent reprisals should
be categorically banned.
At the far right end of the continuum are belligerent reprisals that do not
shock the conscience and, in the gritty world of pragmatism, are reasonable and
UDWLRQDOUHVSRQVHVWRLQGXFHDQDGYHUVDU\¶VFRPSOLDQFHZLWK,+/ 179 To some
that take an absolutist approach to reprisals, the suggestion that there is any
place on the continuum for belligerent reprisals is cause for great concern. But,
176.
177.
178.
179.
(2010).

TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 460.
Mitchell, supra note 50, at 162±64.
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 60, § 18.18.3.4, at 1088.
Michael A. Newton, Reconsidering Reprisals, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT¶L L. 361, 361
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even the ICRC in their 2005 Study on Customary International Humanitarian
Law did not take the position that there is a complete ban on belligerent
reprisals.180 Rule 145 of the Study VWDWHG ³Where not prohibited by
LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZEHOOLJHUHQWUHSULVDOVDUHVXEMHFWWRVWULQJHQWFRQGLWLRQV´181
An example at this end of the spectrum may involve the use of a prohibited
weapon against combatants or military objectives.182 For example, suppose a
State is a party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions183 or Ottawa
Convention184 and uses cluster munitions or antipersonnel mines as a
belligerent reprisal against another State party. Assuming, arguendo, that the
other criteria for a belligerent reprisal are met, such an action is permissible.185
For somewhat obvious reasons, the parallel to countermeasures would be the
strongest in this type of case.
Tallinn Manual 2.0 provides a hypothetical to illustrate a lawful cyber
operation for those States not a party to 1977 AP I.186 In the scenario, the armed
forces of one State bomb the medical facilities of another State in the context
of an armed conflict and the victim State is not a party to AP I.187 In response,
and after repeated demands to cease the bombings, the Prime Minister of the
victim State approves a cyber-attack against a power generation facility used
exclusively to provide power to the civilian population.188 The purpose of this
cyber reprisal operation is to compel the State which was attacking the medical
facilities to stop.189 So long as the Prime Minister orders the cessation of cyberattacks as soon as the aggressive state stops attacking its medical facilities, the
reprisal is legal according to the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts.190
The middle of the continuum is the most important to this analysis and one
where the employment of cyber means and methods are legitimate so long as
their purpose is to induce an adversary to be in compliance with IHL and so
long as they are tailored to mitigate some of negative and collateral effects. It

180. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 513.
181. Id.
182. WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 54 (2009).
183. THE
CONVENTION
ON
CLUSTER
MUNITIONS,
www.clusterconvention.org/
[https://perma.cc/FM5T-XBZ4] (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).
184. Anti-Personnel Landmines Convention, UNITED NATIONS OFF. GENEVA,
www.un.org/disarmament/geneva/aplc/ [https://perma.cc/G3M3-AWNE] (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).
185. BOOTHBY, supra note 182, at 54.
186. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 462.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. The Experts did note that if the belligerent reprisal involved attacking the other State¶s
medical facilities that would be considered unlawful under Tallinn Manual 2.0, Rule 108.
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is important to reiterate that the ability to develop and execute belligerent
reprisals in the middle of the continuum depends, in part, on whether the State
is a party to AP I as seen in the example above. The United States, again, is not
a party to AP I with one of the primary reasons being the wide-ranging
prohibitions against reprisals.191 7KH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV¶ SRVLWLRQ LQ WKLV FDVH
stemmed from its concern about what could lawfully be done immediately to
stop an enemy State from violating IHL.192
So, what are the likely objects a State may attack as a belligerent reprisal
that would be considered in the middle of the continuum? So long as a State
meets all the criteria as outlined above in Part III,193 reprisals may include a
F\EHURSHUDWLRQDJDLQVWDSRUWLRQRID6WDWH¶VHFRQRPLFLQIUDVWUXFWXUHVXFKDV
communication and transportation networks, financial markets, or energy
sectors.194 These reprisals would need to be narrowly tailored such that they
cause disruption, inconvenience or, in some cases, perhaps reversible nonpermanent damage to a target.195 Additionally, using a reprisal to target the
civilian leadership of a State in order to exploit damaging personal and
professional information may induce a State adversary to comply with IHL.
This is a non-exhaustive list of potential targets for a cyber reprisal and are best
viewed as illustrating the middle of the continuum. However, what becomes
apparent is that through the use of cyber belligerent reprisals a State can
meaningfully enforce IHL compliance without causing repugnant and
irreparable harm. Of course, further discussion on the reconceptualization of
cyber belligerent reprisals is necessary to provide greater clarity on the middle
of the continuum.
Viewing cyber reprisals along this continuum provides decision-makers the
flexibility of options to respond in a lawful manner against a belligerent State
while also remedying the shortcoming of enforcing IHL. While belligerent
reprisals have been generally discarded by the international community, and
justifiably so, cyber operations warrant a re-examination of this tool for IHL
enforcement. A dialogue between States on this possibility would be a worthy
endeavor.
VII. CONCLUSION
In sum, the employment of belligerent reprisals is a course of action with
wide-ranging implications and should never be undertaken lightly.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Matheson, supra note 59, at 420.
SOLIS, supra note 10, at 132.
See supra notes 66±93 and accompanying text.
ROSCINI, supra note 148, at 104.
Id. at 106.
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Nevertheless, they are lawful acts if approved at the highest levels of
government with the purpose to compel an adversary to comply with IHL.
Using this ancient enforcement mechanism provides a means to overcome the
anemic deficiency of enforcing IHL. Although there have been efforts to
impose meaningful international penal sanctions in the past few decades, much
more needs to be done during the armed conflict itself to ensure compliance.
As illustrated in this article, cyber means and methods create opportunities to
compel an adversary to comply with IHL while, at the same time, mitigating
the effects of cyber operations.
Some well-intentioned individuals and groups may summarily dismiss
belligerent reprisals because of the horrific abuses and risks associated with
their use. But, viewing countermeasures as a conceptual backdrop in terms of
purpose and limitations, the time has come to at least consider the possibilities
at the intersection of IHL and emerging technologies. As uncivilized,
repugnant, and archaic as it may seem, strictly controlled reprisals may be
justifiable as a proportionate response to the criminal acts committed by an
adversary to prompt compliance with the law. Emerging cyber means and
methods may be the right tool at the right time to do just that.

* * *

